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The Impact of China on Sub-Saharan Africa 
Raphael Kaplinsky, Dorothy McCormick and Mike Morris 
Summary
This paper focuses on the rapidly-growing links between China and SSA. The 
spotlight is placed on three vectors of interaction – trade, foreign investment and
aid. Chinese involvement in Africa is driven predominantly by the quest for material
inputs (oil and other primary commodities) required for its infrastructural invest-
ments and booming manufacturing sector. At least in the early years of this involve-
ment, there appears to be close coordination between Chinese involvement in
these three related vectors.
Chinese involvement in SSA has important policy implications for growth, 
distribution and policy. Whilst it has provided a spur for some of SSA’s key 
commodity exporting economies, its impact on manufacturing (both that destined
for domestic and export markets) has been adverse. Even some of the benefits of
the commodity price boom are ambiguous, since these are often associated with
rising exchange rates, corruption and violent conflict. Commodity-based production
also has adverse distributional impacts when compared to manufacturing.
The rapid growth and significance of enhanced Chinese participation in SSA has
important implications for both future research (there are large unknowns and the
picture is changing so rapidly) and for a poverty-focused policy agenda.
Keywords: China; sub-Saharan Africa; trade; investment; textiles. 
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Executive summary
The challenge: maximising opportunities and minimising threats
Although SSA’s trade with China is relatively small in comparison to its trade with
the industrialised countries, it has grown very rapidly, especially since 2001. There is
a danger of overestimating the historic and present impact, and underestimating
the potential future impact of China on SSA.
1. At a general level, China’s impact on SSA:
l Involves three primary types of links – trade, production/FDI and aid; 
l Is in some cases complementary to growth and poverty alleviation, in other
cases it is competitive;
l Is both direct (in bilateral links between individual countries and China) and 
indirect (with the impact being felt in third-country markets);
l Reflects a mix of strategic, political and economic factors, and involves a range 
of stakeholders, both within China and in SSA.
Since these varied impacts are unevenly felt within and between countries, it is
important to maintain a comprehensive perspective if the opportunities are to be
maximised and the threats minimised in such a way as to sustain poverty alleviation
and to enhance income distribution.
2. More specifically, with regard to the trade channel:
l China has predominantly imported a limited number of products – mostly oil 
and hard commodities – from a limited number of SSA economies. In return, it
predominantly exports manufactures, mostly final consumption goods. 
l Most is known about the direct trade links, in which China now has a growing 
trade surplus with SSA. These direct trade links combine complementary 
impacts (notably enhancing consumer welfare through cheap goods), and 
competitive impacts where there is evidence that domestic manufacturers are 
in some countries being squeezed by China-sourced imports. 
l The indirect trade links, arising through Chinese participation in global markets,
are more difficult to assess. In general, it would appear that SSA economies 
gain from these indirect links, since the price of many of SSA’s imports are 
falling due to growing Chinese competitiveness, and China’s imports of
commodities are pushing up the prices of SSA exports. However, in some 
sectors, notably clothing and furniture, there is persuasive evidence that China’s
growing competitiveness in global markets is having a very harmful impact on 
poor SSA exporting economies. Lesotho, Swaziland, Madagascar and Kenya 
have all been badly hit, and there have been particularly damaging impacts on 
South Africa. Employment loss has been high, with very severe distributional 
and poverty impacts.
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3. With regard to the FDI, production and aid vectors: 
l The Chinese presence in SSA appears to be driven primarily by the strategic
search for raw materials rather than for final markets or for low-cost 
production platforms.
l Chinese firms work to longer time horizons than Western and Japanese firms, 
in part because many are state-owned and do not appear to be subject to the 
same short-term profit-maximising imperatives, and in part because of their
access to low-cost capital. 
l There is increasing Chinese participation in the energy and resource sectors, 
particularly in fragile states such as the Sudan, Angola and the DRC. This is 
linked to attempts by some fragile states to evade pressures by western donors 
and NGOs to promote more transparent and better governance.
l Other realms of activity are in infrastructure development (Chinese firms 
appear to have costs which are one-quarter to one-half less than Western and 
South African firms); in small enterprises in some countries (for example Sierra 
Leone); in trading (for example, Namibia); and in farming (for example, as is 
emerging in Mozambique). 
l Chinese aid is growing throughout the region, particularly in recent years, and 
appears to be carefully targeted to complement its commercial activities, 
including in fragile states.
What we don’t know
Whilst these major policy challenges are clear, important key knowledge gaps exist
which need to be filled if policy responses are to be appropriately nuanced for
individual country circumstances. The major knowledge gaps are with regard to:
l The need for baseline studies to assess the changing future impact of China on 
SSA;
l Analyses of the determinants of SSA competitiveness and the steps required to
enhance productivity (for example, in clothing, textiles, footwear and furniture, 
as well as in export-oriented food crops);
l A more thorough assessment of indirect impacts of China’s trade on SSA, 
facilitating the development of appropriate policies for providing special and 
differential treatment to low income SSA economies in global markets;
l Determining the impact of China on consumer welfare, income distribution 
and absolute poverty levels in SSA, through an analysis of the consumer bene
fits derived from cheaper imports, and the distributional implications of a 
switch in specialisation away from labour-intensive manufactures to capital 
intensive commodities;
l Distinguishing generic from sub-regional and country-specific impacts, aiding 
the classification of different types of SSA economies;
l Identifying likely future areas of threat and opportunity;
09 
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l Determining the drivers of China’s strategic engagement with SSA and their
impact on transparent and better governance on the continent.
Conclusions
This growing Chinese presence raises six major policy challenges for SSA if the
manifold opportunities are to be grasped and the threats minimised:
1 It poses particular threats to the manufacturing sector. Here the outlook is 
not entirely bleak, but SSA countries need to take explicit steps to counter
act the dangers posed to existing and future capabilities in industry. 
2 Although the commodity boom favours some SSA economies, it poses very
severe problems of economic management. Poorly-handled, a resource-
boom can easily become a resource-curse. Much can be learned from the 
experience of other countries (including in SSA) in handling these resource-
booms.
3 Notwithstanding the welfare gains to the poor from lower import prices, 
the expansion of capital-intensive mineral production and the decline of
labour-intensive manufactures pose severe challenges for poverty-alleviation
and income distribution. There is, moreover, the additional problem that 
resource-production is closely associated with violence, corruption and 
fragile states. Policies to ameliorate these potential adverse poverty-related 
impacts need to be addressed.
4 Linked to this, China has actively forged closer links with fragile states and 
this has undermined attempts by the global community to enhance 
transparency and better governance. There is also emerging evidence that 
attempts to foster better corporate and environmental governance are also 
being undermined by China’s presence in some SSA countries.
5 African economies are being pulled in different directions with regard to 
their linkages with other economies. One pressure is to sustain historical 
links with the EU and North America, cemented by various preferential 
trading agreements. Another pressure is to strengthen links with other SSA
economies, particularly in southern Africa. A third pressure is to enhance 
links with Asia in general, and China in particular. Scarce administrative and 
strategic capabilities may require SSA economies to choose how they 
respond to these various pulls. There are strong arguments for a concerted 
‘look East’ policy.
6 The key capability which SSA economies require is the development of
dynamic capabilities to scan changing environments, to develop appropriate 
strategic responses and to implement these strategies effectively. Unless 
these capabilities are built – in government, in the corporate and farming 
sectors, and in civil society – the opportunities offered by Chinese growth 
may be overwhelmed by the threats which are raised. This applies 
particularly to emerging sectors of Chinese demand (for example, imports 
of food products).
All of this poses severe challenges for a variety of stakeholders:
l for governments, firms, farms and civil society within SSA;
l for Chinese stakeholders who may be insufficiently aware of their impact on 
SSA;
l for DFID and other bi- and multi-lateral agencies who have much to offer in 
helping to build appropriate (dynamic) capabilities, and to mediate between 
different governments and stakeholders.
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1 Introduction: caution and context
A policeman encounters a drunkard under a streetlight and asks him what
he is doing. ‘Looking for my house key’ is the stuttered and barely audible
reply. Ever willing to help, the policeman says – ‘I’ll help you look. Now,
where exactly do you think you lost the key?’. ‘Oh, near the pub, a couple of
blocks away’. ‘Really’, says the policeman, ‘in that case, why look here?’. ‘Oh,
the light is much better here – I’d never find it in the dark near the pub’.
The aphorism of the drunk and the policeman cautions us to be aware of two
important pitfalls in assessing the impact of China on SSA (or indeed other regions
and countries). First, there is a danger that we focus on those issues where we
know something, and ignore those for which we can find no information. This
might either be because an issue is real and important, but the information has not
been collected, or because the issue is emerging rapidly, and has not yet manifested
itself clearly. The second important failing is that there is a tendency to concentrate
on measurable phenomena (for example, trade data), and ignore difficult-to-
measure issues (for example, the extent to which FDI is motivated by geo-strategic
reasons).
It is important to keep a sense of perspective on the existing and potential impacts
of China on SSA. Although there has been a recent resurgence of growth in the
SSA region, the overall picture on both poverty-reduction and growth remains
bleak. There is thus a tendency to continually search for quick-fixes for SSA. As
these fail to deliver rapid results, a new straw is clutched. The danger is that China
becomes the new ‘big opportunity’ and in so doing, we overestimate both the
speed with which these opportunities can be grasped, and the potential negative
impact which China’s growth poses for SSA. 
Figure 1.1 alerts us to this danger. It shows that China (and India’s) total trade with
SSA is a small proportion of SSA’s trade with the industrialised countries. On the
other hand, as Table 1.1 shows, the rate of change in these import and export
shares has been very rapid, particularly after 2001. In the case of SSA exports, trade
with China as a proportion of trade with the industrialised countries rose from 0.4
per cent in 1990 to 2.3 per cent in 1997 and 9 per cent in 2004, and in the case of
imports, the rise was even more remarkable, from 1.8 per cent (1990), to 3.8 per
cent (1997) and to 12.3 per cent (2004). 
To the extent that trade links are an accurate reflection of the wider impact of
China on SSA, we draw two conclusions from this trade data. First SSA’s current
trade links with China are relatively small in relation to its trade with the rest of the
world, suggesting a low level of present impact. But, second, China-SSA trade is
growing very rapidly. If this growth rate is sustained, the likely future impacts may
be very substantial. A similar pattern emerges with regard to flows of FDI and aid
into SSA, but these are difficult to quantify.
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Figure 1.1 China-SSA trade as a proportion of SSA trade with
industrialised countries
Source: Calculated from IMF DOTS (www.imfstatistics.org/DOT/, accessed 2 February 2006).
Table 1.1 Trade with China and India as a proportion of trade with
the industrialised countries
Source: Calculated from IMF DOTS (www.imfstatistics.org/DOT/, accessed 2 February 2006).
2 A framework for assessing the 
impact of China on SSA
It is important to be systematic on assessing the impact of China on SSA, 
particularly in the context of uneven data availability. In providing a framework for a
coherent and overall evaluation we can distinguish a number of vectors through
which these impacts may be transmitted. The three primary vectors in the case of
SSA which are covered in this Agenda Report are:
l Trade flows
l FDI flows, technology transfer and integration in global value chains
l Aid flows.
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SSA exports to China 0.43% 2.31% 4.10% 8.96%
SSA exports to India 1.37% 3.49% 4.38% 1.58%
China and India 1.81% 5.80% 8.48% 10.54%
SSA imports from China 1.76% 3.84% 6.04% 12.26%
SSA imports from India 0.83% 2.65% 2.76% 4.20%
China and India 2.60% 6.49% 8.80% 16.45%
These are not the only vectors through which a given country or region may have
an impact on another country or region (IDS 2006). For example, there may be
impacts transmitted through the environment, through financial flows, or through
participation in institutions of regional and global governance. 
In each of these vectors, it is possible for China-SSA relations to be either comple-
mentary or competitive (or indeed both). In the case of the trade channel, for
example, China may provide SSA with appropriate capital goods and cheap 
consumer goods, and SSA may provide China with the commodities it requires to
fuel its continued economic expansion. Both countries gain from this relationship.
On the other hand, China’s export of consumer goods to SSA may displace local
producers, leading to competitive impacts on workers and entrepreneurs in these
sectors. 
This distinction between complementarity and competitiveness is easily understood.
By contrast the distinction between the direct and indirect impacts is less obvious,
and its significance is less widely recognised. The direct impacts are relatively simple
and clear. In the case of the trade illustrations discussed in the previous paragraph,
for example, both complementary and competitive impacts occur as a result of
direct bilateral relations between China and SSA. These impacts are often also easily
measured, by charting the direct trade flows between China and SSA, breaking this
down by sectors and countries, and over time. The indirect impacts are less obvious
and occur as a result of China’s relations with third-countries, working their way
indirectly through to SSA. Staying with the case of trade for example, China’s
demand for commodities may raise their prices at a global level, and even though a
country like Ethiopia does not export animal feed to China (a direct impact), it sells
animal feeds into a global market in which prices have been raised by China’s 
growing imports (indirect impact). As we shall see below, and particularly in the
case of trade, the indirect impacts of China on SSA may often be much more 
substantial than the direct impacts. However, almost all of the analysis of the
impact of China on SSA (and indeed on other developing countries) focuses on
direct, bilateral relations, and hence tend to miss some of the key issues of
importance.
Figure 3.1 integrates these three sets of factors – vectors, complementary-competi-
tive and direct-indirect impacts – into a synthetic framework which can be used to
assess the overall impact of China on SSA. As will be shown below, there are a
number of empty cells in this synthetic matrix and it is unclear to what extent this
represents the pattern of China’s impact on SSA or the underdeveloped state of
our knowledge on these impacts. (We return to this issue in the concluding section
of this report.)
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Table 2.1 A synthetic framework for assessing the impact of China
on SSA
3 Vectors, complementary-
competitive and direct-indirect 
impacts
3.1 The trade channel
3.1.1 Assessing the impact of direct trade links
There is a developing understanding of the direct bilateral trade links between SSA
and China (notably Jenkins and Edwards 2005; and Chen et al. 2006). In Figure 1.1
and Table 1.1 we showed how although China currently represents only a small
share of SSA’s trade, this is growing very rapidly. Imports from China are expanding
more rapidly than exports, so that SSA has a growing trade deficit with China
(Figure 3.1). If oil is excluded, in 2005 SSA’s trade balance with China was negative
(a deficit of $7.3bn); if oil is included, it ran a trade surplus of $5.9bn in the same
year.
Figure 3.1 Balance of trade between China and SSA, 1980–2004
Source: Calculated from IMF DOTS (www.imfstatistics.org/DOT/, accessed 2 February 2006).
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The basis for China’s rising trade links with SSA has been its extraordinarily rapid
growth of more than nine per cent p.a. since 1979. One of the main features of
this growth has been its deepening trade orientation, with the trade-GDP ratio of
68 per cent in 2005, well above the ‘norm’ for large countries. Within this, China
has become a major exporter of manufactures (see below) and a significant
importer of commodities.1 Table 3.1 shows the growth in trade dependence for a
variety of key commodities produced in and exported by various SSA economies.
Between 1998 and 2003, China’s share of increased global demand was 96 per
cent for steel, 99 per cent for nickel, 100 per cent for copper and 76 per cent for
aluminium (Lennon, personal communication). This was associated with a depletion
of global stocks and an increase in global commodity prices. For example, between
2002 and 2005, average stocks of base metals fell from seven to 3.5 weeks, and
LMEX average prices more than doubled, rising by 160 per cent (derived from
Lennon and Rowley 2006). 
Low global inventories and high supply inelasticities suggest that global commodity
prices will stay firm for some time. But there will inevitably be important changes in
the commodity composition of this trade. For example, until mid 2005 China was a
large net importer of steel, with a consequent increase in steel, iron ore and steam
coal prices. But during 2005 a number of very large new steel plants were 
commissioned in China, and it has now become a net exporter, with a consequent
knock-on effect on lower global steel prices. The price of coal and iron ore (and the
shipping required to transport them) remains strong.
Table 3.1 China’s import dependence (%)
Source: Derived from Chen et al. (2005) and Sandrey (2006).
China’s growing demand for commodity imports has led to an expansion of
commodity exports from some SSA economies. As Figure 3.3 shows, the share in
total SSA exports to China of five families of commodities (oil, iron ore, cotton, 
diamonds and logs) grew from less than 50 per cent to more than 80 per cent
between 1995 and 2005. The overwhelming bulk and most rapidly-growing export
was oil so that whilst the growth of other commodity exports was at a high level,
the proportion of the total which they accounted for fell during the decade after
IDS WORKING PAPER 291
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1 This has major implications for the global manufactures-commodities terms of trade. See 
Kaplinsky (2005 and 2006).
2001 2002 2003 Share of China imports from SSA, 2004
Oil 27.8 30.3 36.0 30.6
Iron ore 29.9 32.5 36.2 4.1
Copper 36.2 43.2 44.0
Cotton 3.6 4.8 18.4 21.2
1995. SSA manufactured exports to China were mostly from South Africa. But even
in this case, only two products were not derived from basic metals.2
Figure 3.2 Composition of Chinese imports from SSA
Source: derived from Sandrey (2006).
For some SSA economies, the importance of China as a direct destination of
exports grew particularly rapidly. In the case of oil, for example, China’s share of
exports was overwhelming, particularly for fragile states such as Angola, Sudan and
the Congo. A similar picture is true for the DRC in the case of basic metal exports
(Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Share of particular commodities in exports to China
Source: Chen et al. (2005).
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2 These were oil products (less than 1.5 per cent of its exports to China) and polymers (less 
than one per cent) (calculated from Sandrey 2006).
Crude oil Metals Wood Cotton
Angola 100
Sudan 98.8
Nigeria 88.9
Congo 85.9
Gabon 54.8 42.3
DRC 99.6
Ghana 59.8
S Africa 45.6
Cameroon 39.7
Tanzania 23.4 53.8
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On the import side, only seven SSA countries source a significant share of their
total imports from China. Sudan, which has growing and policy-related energy links
with China (see below) stands out, with 14.2 per cent of its imports coming from
China, followed by Ghana and Tanzania (9.1 per cent), Nigeria (7.1 per cent), Ethiopia
and Kenya (6.4 per cent) and Uganda (5.1 per cent) (Jenkins and Edwards 2005).
Almost all of these imports were manufactured products.
So much for the historic picture. Looking forward, the World Bank study of trade
complementarity (World Bank 2004a and 2004b) attempted to identify areas of
potential bilateral trade between China (and India) and SSA. They computed a ‘Trade
Complementarity Index’ based on SSA’s revealed comparative advantage in exports,
and China’s revealed comparative advantage in imports, weighted by the 
importance of these products in the exports and imports of these regions, using a
combination of 3- and 4-digit trade data (see Appendix D, World Bank 2004a, 
Vol 2). This exercise concluded that on the basis of existing economic specialisation,
the potential for future bilateral trade growth with China was not strong, but if
China’s growing demand for commodities were sustained, this would improve. 
Among Asian countries, India (27.8), Korea (11.8), and Japan (6.3) have strong
complementarity with African countries on average; these countries are 
followed by Thailand (3.9), Pakistan (3.3), the Philippines (1.9), and Indonesia (1.6).
Other countries such as Singapore (0.6), Hong Kong (0.1), Taiwan (0.0), China 
(-0.3), and Malaysia (-1.2) do not show high complementarity … The weak 
complementarity for some Asian economies such as China and Taiwan seems
counterintuitive given the growing volume of African exports to these Asian
economies. The reason for China’s unexpectedly low score, for example, is
because the country has been obtaining raw materials mostly from domestic
sources until recently.
(World Bank 2004a, Vol 2: 32) 
In summary, looking at this evidence on the direct trade links between China and
SSA, on the export side SSA gains from China’s demand for commodities, and on
the import side, it gains cheap and appropriate consumer and capital goods.
Outside of clothing and textiles (see below), there appears to be little trade
between China and SSA in intermediate goods and little incorporation of China and
SSA in coordinated global value chains. Jenkins and Edwards argue that most of
these imports into SSA have substituted for imports from outside of SSA, with the
possible exception of Ethiopia and Nigeria, suggesting little displacement of domes-
tic production and few negative impacts on employment and local production.
These conclusions suggest a synergistic link between SSA and China and help to
explain the high sense of optimism which prevails in SSA on the potential opportu-
nities opened for SSA by China’s rapid trade expansion.
However, this optimistic picture of opportunities opened-up by growing bilateral
trade links between SSA and China may reflect a misplaced sense of optimism.
There are three major reasons for suggesting a more cautious set of conclusions.
First, the analyses of Jenkins and Edwards and the World Bank are conducted on
3-digit SITC trade data. Whilst this shows important aggregate trends, it hides some
important specific impacts which only show-up with different, firm-level method-
ologies. In a study conducted for DFID, Kaplinsky and Morris report that domesti-
IDS WORKING PAPER 291
17 
cally produced clothing and furniture manufactures in both Ghana and South Africa
are being displaced by imports from China (Kaplinsky and Morris 2006a). Similar
anecdotal evidence can be found with regard to clothing and footwear manu-
facture in many SSA economies. For example, in Zambia the trades unions assert
that imports of Chinese clothes have undermined the clothing and electrical sector,
and in Nigeria trade unions blame Chinese imports for the loss of 350,000 jobs
(www.nzherald.co.nz/). In Ethiopia, although competition from Chinese shoe
imports has led to an upgrading of processes and design by many domestic firms, it
has simultaneously had a negative impact on employment and domestic output. A
study of 96 micro-, small and medium domestic producers reported that as a 
consequence of Chinese competition, 28 per cent were forced into bankruptcy, and
32 per cent downsized activity. The average size of microenterprises fell from 7 to
4.8 employees, and of SMEs, from 41 to 17 (Egziabher 2006). 
However, damaging though these impacts might be, it is not so much the displace-
ment of existing producers which is an outcome of China’s growing exports to
SSA, but in relation to future production. Here, particularly in the case of light 
consumer goods – the bulk of Chinese exports to SSA – there are important and
adverse long-term implications for SSA industrialisation (Kaplinsky and Morris
2006b). What ‘spaces’ will they be able to move into as their economies grow and
they seek to diversify?
However, the third and by far the most important indicator of caution arises in
regard to the indirect impact of China’s trade with SSA. That is, it is not so much in
the growth of direct bilateral economic trade links that we must look to for
impact, but on the indirect links. Both China and SSA trade in global markets. But
China’s trade footprint is so large that it is in itself altering global prices, and this
has significant impacts on SSA. The problem is that these indirect trade impacts are
much more difficult to analyse than the direct impact, which is why almost all of
the analysis so far has been on the growth and impact of direct trade links.
3.1.2  Assessing the impact of indirect trade links
A number of attempts have been made to assess the impact of indirect trade links.
Using a high level of data disaggregation (HS 8-digit) Kaplinsky and Santos Paulino
show that the greater China’s participation in trade with the EU, the more likely
product prices are to fall, and that this impact is greatest with regard to the 
products exported into the EU by low-income economies (Kaplinsky and Santos
Paulino 2006). The major product of relevance to SSA was the export of clothing
into the EU by Mauritius, Madagascar and South Africa. 
Jenkins and Edwards estimate the significance of indirect trade links by computing
Export Similarity Indices, utilising 3-digit SITC trade data. They conclude from this
that there is little evidence of widespread competition in global markets for manu-
factured products. However, they caution their results by noting that they are using
a high level of data aggregation. For example, by illustration, at 3-digits Botswana
and India export the same products – diamonds – and may seem to be in comp-
etition with each other. But whilst Botswana exports raw diamonds, India uses
these raw diamonds and exports cut-diamonds. In this case, rather than competi-
tion between Botswana and India, the relationship is one of complementarity. Thus,
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at a high 3-digit level of aggregation the data is unable to distinguish adequately
between inter- and intra-industry effects.
Stevens and Kennan (2006) adopt an innovative approach, again utilising trade data,
but at a much higher level of disaggregation (6-digit HS classifications). They begin
in similar vein to the World Bank’s Trade Complementarity Index by identifying
products which were significant and rapidly-growing export and import items for
China and were in turn relatively intensively traded by developing countries. This
yields seven major imports into China (animal feeds, chemicals and five comm-
odities), and eight major Chinese exports (ferrous metals, aluminium and six 
manufactures). In each case they identify major SSA exporters and importers. They
determine beneficiary countries as those which export a product which China
imports (a growing market opportunity) or import a product which China exports
(falling prices of more appropriate products). The losers are those economies which
export products which China exports (export competition and falling prices) or
import products which China imports (rising prices).
Using this methodology, it would seem that more SSA economies gain in more
sectors than those who lose (Table 3.3). Most of the gains are experienced by 
countries which import a product which China exports (column 2 in Table 3.3),
although some also gain as exporters of products which China imports (column 1).
A few SSA countries lose by competing in global markets where China is an
exporter (column 4), and a smaller number of countries who lose by importing
products which China imports from the world (column 5). 
3.1.2.1 Assessing the indirect trade links in the clothing and textile sectors
Although insightful, this analysis of indirect trade effects remains at a relatively high
level of trade aggregation (6-digits) and masks the severity of China’s negative 
indirect impact of SSA manufacturing exports. This only emerges from more
detailed sectoral analyses. By far the most significant manufactured export from
SSA in recent years has been in the clothing and textile sector, largely as a result of
US AGOA preferences. Table 3.4 shows not just significant export growth, but
growing reliance on the US market. For some SSA economies, these rapidly-
growing exports have become especially significant. In 2002 clothing and textile
exports accounted for 50 per cent of Lesotho’s GDP. In Kenya, in 2004 employ-
ment in the clothing EPZ enterprises was equivalent to 20 per cent of formal 
sector manufacturing employment.
The primary driver for these growing clothing and textile exports has been trade
preferences in general and the US AGOA preference scheme in particular
However, within AGOA, there has been a key derogation on the rules of origin
which allows SSA exporters to import inputs from outside of the AGOA region or
the US. (Mauritius and South Africa, which do not qualify as least developed 
countries, do not qualify for this derogation, although Mauritius was provided with
a one-year derogation between 2004–2005). This derogation was initially limited
to September 2004, then extended to September 2007, and has now been further
extended to 2012. The intent of the original rules of origin was to encourage 
backward integration into the textile sector. However, the consequence of applying
the derogation has been that, the only significant case of the development of a
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textile industry has been the construction of a $100m denim plant in Lesotho, 
coming on stream in mid-2004.
Table 3.3 Trade overlap – number of sectors by country
(See table footnote for explanations of column headings)
Potential gain: Column 1 – SSA exports which China imports; Column 2 – SSA imports of China
exports; Column 3 – addition of Columns 1 and 2
Potential loss: Column 4 – SSA exports what China exports; Column 5 – SSA imports what China
imports; Column 6 – addition of Columns 4 and 5
Source: From Stevens and Kennan (2006).
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Country
No. of sectors
Trade balance gain Trade balance loss
Angola 0 6 6 1 0 1
Benin 0 2 2 0 0 0
Burkina Faso 1 0 1 0 0 0
Cameroon 0 1 1 0 0 0
Chad 0 0 0 0 0 0
Congo Rep. 0 2 2 0 0 0
Congo DR 1 0 1 0 0 0
Ethiopia 1 0 1 0 1 1
Ghana 0 4 4 1 1 2
Guinea 1 1 2 0 0 0
Kenya 0 2 2 1 1 2
Madagascar 0 1 1 0 1 1
Malawi 0 0 0 0 1 1
Mali 0 1 1 0 0 0
Mauritania 1 1 2 0 0 0
Mauritius 0 2 2 0 1 1
Mozambique 0 1 1 0 1 1
Niger 1 1 2 0 0 0
Nigeria 1 6 7 2 1 3
Senegal 0 1 1 0 0 0
South Africa 3 3 6 2 2 4
Sudan 1 4 5 1 0 1
Tanzania 1 2 3 0 0 0
Togo 0 1 1 0 0 0
Uganda 0 1 1 0 0 0
Zambia 1 0 1 0 1 1
Zimbabwe 1 0 1 0 0 0
Table 3.4 Growth of SSA clothing and textile exports, 2000–2004
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Country Year Exports $‘000 US Share (%)
AGOA as Share
of Exports to US
(%)
Kenya
2000 78,000 89.6 NA
2001 87,000 92.7 80
2002 156,000 95.9 96.6
2003 234,000 95.8 93.7
2004 333,000 95.4 97.9
2005 306,000 95.3 98.5
YTD 2006 97.5
Lesotho
2000 154,000 94.9 NA
2001 237,000 94.3 60.1
2002 350,000 97.9 98.9
2003 429,000 97.7 94.9
2004 496,000 97.3 98.2
2005 406,000 96.5 99.4
YTD 2006 99.4
Madagascar
2000 633,000 18.9 NA
2001 709,000 27.4 51.8
2002 387,000 26.1 84.4
2003 527,000 41.5 94.8
2004 784,000 45.5 97.2
2005 771,000 37.0 98.5
YTD 2006 96.0
Mauritius
2000 1,652,000 16.3 NA
2001 1,561,000 16.6 16.3
2002 1,524,000 18.3 41.8
2003 1,629,000 17.9 50.2
2004 1,638,000 15.0 65.2
2005 1,384,000 12.4 85.8
YTD 2006 92.1
South Africa
2000 867,000 31.0 NA
2001 864,000 38.3 17.4
2002 927,000 39.1 46.9
2003 1,027,000 41.2 48.7
2004 756,000 44.1 66.3
2005 571,000 33.8 64.8
YTD 2006 53.1
Swaziland
2000 56,000 88.4 NA
2001 74,000 89.0 17.1
2002 118,000 92.9 82.7
2003 174,000 97.7 89.9
2004 205,000 98.3 98.3
2005 171,000 99.4 99.0
YTD 2006 99.5
In assessing the outcome of the two years of quota removal on these six SSA
clothing and textile exporters, we concentrate on the clothing sector since with the
exception of South Africa, there are negligible direct exports of textiles to the US.
In each case we compare export volumes and market shares for all exports.
However, since a key to market developments lies in unit price behaviour, we also
analyse unit prices at the highest level of trade disaggregation (10-digit HS product
categories). 
As can be seen from Table 3.5 and Figure 3.3, the major trends were that:
l The value of SSA clothing exports to the US dropped by 25 per cent between 
2004 and 2006 (January–November for both years). This masked differential 
country performance. Lesotho experienced a fall in export value of 15 per cent, 
most of which occurred in 2005; its exports stabilised in 2006. Madagascar, 
fared worse (a decline of 24 per cent), as did Swaziland (22 per cent). Kenya 
saw largely unchanged exports (a fall of only three per cent). The biggest 
casualties were South Africa (a decline of 54 per cent) and Mauritius (a decline 
of 62 per cent). Significantly neither of these latter two economies were able 
to utilise the 3rd country fabric derogation. 
l By contrast, in the same period, the value of China’s clothing and textile 
exports to the US increased by 82 per cent. In the major products exported to 
the US by AGOA, the value of Chinese exports rose by 161 per cent (the 
aggregate export values are for 2004–2006; the changes in unit values are for
2004–2005).3
l Unit prices on average remained reasonably stable in key product groupings for
individual SSA countries, with Madagascar experiencing the sharpest decline (10
per cent). In contrast, in the same product groupings, the unit value of Chinese 
exports almost halved. (However, it is not clear to what extent this was due to 
a reduction in the unit prices of individual products, or China’s entry into 
producing lower-end products within each of these 10-digit product 
classifications.) 
l In general AGOA economies performed less badly in their major exported 
items than they did in aggregate, suggesting a process of specialisation. 
However, alarmingly, in general China’s export growth and the rate of price 
decline in these AGOA-populated sectors were greater than for its overall tex
tile and clothing exports, suggesting potentially heightened competition for
SSA products in the future. 
l There has been significant churn as exporting firms in SSA have struggled with 
competition. For example, seven of the 10 largest product items (10-digit 
classification) exported from AGOA between January–November 2006 were 
not exported to the US in the same period in 2005, and only six of the ten 
major exported items in 2005 were exported in 2006.
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3 Because of the degree in churn in exported products (see accompanying text below) it was 
not feasible to compare unit price performance over the 2004–2006 period.
l The share of SSA exporters in the US clothing and textiles imports grew 
between 2001 and 2004, reflecting the combination of quota-access and 
preferential AGOA trading arrangements. However, the removal of MFA 
quotas set back this advance, and African exporters experienced a significant fall
in their share of the US market after quota removal (Figure 3.3). By contrast, 
the share of China in each of these major product markets grew significantly.
Table 3.5 Change in value of clothing exports to the US, 2004,
2005 and 2006 (January–November data in all years) (%)
Source: Calculated from http://dataweb.usitc.gov data (accessed 10 January 2006).
a Unit prices calculated for top 10 products in 2004 for each AGOA country’s exports.
Figure 3.3 AGOA country share of US market in all product 
categories in which country exports were concentrated in
2003–YTD2006
Source: Calculated from http://dataweb.usitc.gov data (accessed 10 January 2006).
a Unit prices calculated for top 10 products in 2004 for each AGOA country’s exports.
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2005/2004 2006/2005 2006/04
Change in Unit
Price of top 10
products
2005/04
SSA China SSA China SSA China SSA China
AGOA -16.5 56.9 -11.4 14.1 -25.2 82.0 -0.9% -46%
Kenya -2.5 77.8 -2.5 13.7 -3.3 106.3 -1.9% -45%
Lesotho -14.3 110.8 0.3 20.8 -14.6 160.4 -3.2% -46%
Madagascar -14.4 72.0 -14.9 16.3 -24.2 104.1 -9.5% -44%
Mauritius -26.4 73.2 -30.6 13.5 -61.6 100.0 -4.6% -45%
Swaziland -9.9 93.0 -16.2 15.3 -22.4 128.1 -2.7% -52%
S Africa -43.7 63.7 -18.7 11.5 -54.0 85.8 3.0% -33%
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A major consequence of this decline in exports from the AGOA region was the
impact on employment and overall economic activity. At its peak, in 2002,
Lesotho’s clothing exports to the US accounted for virtually all manufactured
exports, and were equivalent to 50 per cent of GDP. In Kenya in 2003, clothing
enterprises accounted for the equivalent of nearly 20 per cent of all formal sector
manufacturing employment. Table 3.6 shows the impact of quota removal on
employment in 2005. In Swaziland, most severely affected, overall employment
almost halved. In Lesotho, in the first half of 2005, eight of the 47 garment
exporting factories closed and employment fell by 26 per cent. Even in Kenya
(where clothing exports had only fallen by 2.5 per cent in 2005), employment
declined by nearly 10 per cent. The impact on South Africa is more severe than
appears from Table 3.6, since there had been employment loss in the industry in the
years preceding quota removal, although the exact figures are difficult to determine
(Edwards and Morris 2006). This was a result of competition in third country 
markets (South Africa had never been able to benefit from the 3rd country fabric
provision), an appreciation of the Rand, and the direct impact of Chinese 
competition in the domestic market. 
Table 3.6 Employment decline in the clothing sector, 2004–2005
Source: Kenya and Swaziland – Industry and Government interviews; Lesotho – Morris and
Sedowski (2006); South Africa – Edwards and Morris (2006).
However, after this initial decline following the removal of MFA quotas in 2005,
the position in Lesotho and Kenya stabilised in 2006. In Lesotho’s case, employment
rose from the trough of 40,000 in mid-2005 to 45,000 in late 2006, still below
the 2004 peak of 54,000 in 2004, and the decline in export value was halted. In
Kenya, the fall in export values remained low. Interviews with manufactures and
buyers in both countries and the US suggest three factors which explain this 
performance. First, in the case of Lesotho, its DCCS scheme4 provided subsidies to
local producers. Second, the US buyers sourcing from Lesotho were mindful of the
possibility of China Safeguards being sustained.5 Third, in both countries buyers and
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4 The Duty Credit Certificate Scheme subsidises clothing exporters from South African 
Customs Union member states but is regarded as being WTO non-compliant and was 
ended in 2005. However, under pressure from industry and governments of Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia, the South African government belatedly, and late, 
agreed to an interim extension until March 2007 with a proviso that industry come up with
a new WTO compliant scheme.
2004 2005 % decline
Kenya 34,614 31,745 9.3
Lesotho 54,000 40,000 25.9
S Africa 98,000 83,000 15.3
Swaziland 28,000 16,000 42.9
producers had the expectation that the 3rd country sourcing provision (which had
been due to expire in September 2005), would be maintained (as we shall see
below, this was broadly correct). And, finally, in the case of Kenya, its currency did
not appreciate relative to the US$. (We will return to the significance of these
findings in Section 4.) 
Why did the other AGOA exporters not experience a similar stabilisation in 2006?
Neither South Africa nor Mauritius was able to benefit from the 3rd country fabric
provision. Moreover, South African producers experienced a rising exchange rate
and suffered more than most from a breakdown in extending the DCCS. In the
case of Swaziland, notwithstanding a decline in products destined for the US 
market, 2006 showed a stabilisation of exports as a number of South African firms
relocated and ‘exported’ into the South African domestic market. The stabilisation
of exports in 2006 is not reflected in the data because it is intra SACU trade and
appears as an increase in clothes for the domestic market. Moreover, Swaziland did
not benefit from an efficient policy infrastructure which has distinguished Lesotho’s
response to the crisis. Finally, in the case of Madagascar, two factors led to a 
diversion of exports away from the USA and into other markets. Firstly many of
the principals in the clothing sector were of Mauritian or European origin, and they
had made the strategic decision to focus on the EU market (witness the relatively
low share of the US in Madagascar’s exports in Table 3.4 above).6 Secondly, in 2005
the Madagascan producers began to supply the rapidly expanding South African
market.
A similar story can be told for the resource-intensive and labour-intensive furniture
sector (Kaplinsky and Morris 2006a). SSA’s share of global furniture trade has fallen
since the mid-1990s from more than 1 per cent to less than 1 per cent, and now
largely comprises of exports from SSA. But South African furniture exports are
falling rapidly, and firm-level research shows direct competitive impacts from
Chinese (and Vietnamese and Indonesian) producers in global markets (Table 3.7). 
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5 The Chinese accession agreement to the WTO, allows for safeguard tariffs and quotas to be
applied solely against Chinese textiles and clothing, even when imports exert only a slight 
adverse impact on the domestic industry. In June 2005, the EU and China reached an 
agreement that limited 10 categories of Chinese textiles exports to the EU to between 8 
and 12.5 per cent growth above a specified base period for the next three years. In 
December 2005, the US and Chinese trade representatives agreed to a three-year
agreement reducing US imports of Chinese textile and apparel products in all or parts of 34
sensitive categories.
6 Unlike China which faces duties in exporting clothing into the EU (generally in excess of 12 
per cent, but varying with the product), SSA exporters into the EU benefit from zero-tariff
entry.
Table 3.7 Comparative costs of same item of garden furniture from
SSA and Asia
Source: Kaplinsky and Morris (2006a).
3.2 FDI and the production channel
Most European companies abandoned Sierra Leone long ago, but where
Africa’s traditional business partners see only difficulty, the Chinese see oppor-
tunity. They are the new pioneers in Africa, and – seemingly unnoticed by aid
planners and foreign ministries in Europe – they are changing the face of the
continent.
(Hilsum 2005)
Chinese FDI, and indeed as we shall see, Chinese aid is qualitatively different in kind
from European and North American sourced FDI. Historically, Western and
Japanese FDI in SSA has come from privately-owned corporations focused on 
profit maximisation, generally with relatively short time-horizons. By contrast, much
of Chinese FDI in SSA comes from firms which are either wholly- or partially 
state-owned. They have access to very low-cost capital, and hence operate with
much longer time-horizons. Moreover, many of these investments are either
explicitly or implicitly linked to achieving strategic objectives, often those which are
focused on long-term access to raw materials, and are closely bundled with
Chinese aid (Broadman 2007).
Unlike the trade channel where there is extensive data (particularly in relation to
aggregate flows, and flows over time); data on FDI flows is limited. In part this is
because FDI is inherently difficult to measure. It is also not clear how much of
Chinese economic activity in SSA comprises FDI, how much is a result of winning
commercial tenders, how much is linked to Chinese aid and how much is part of
integrated production networks between Chinese and SSA firms. The anecdotal
evidence emerging from SSA is that in many countries, there is rapid growth of
Chinese entrepreneurship, sometimes through large firms (such as in infrastructure
projects), and in other cases through smaller scale initiatives (such as in Sierra Leone
and Namibia). 
China has become a major participant in the global flow of FDI. But its role has
primarily been as an importer of FDI. Together with Hong Kong, its share of global
FDI directed at developing countries grew from an average of 34 per cent in 1991–6
to 41.7 per cent in 2000.7 By contrast, SSA’s share in the same period fell from 5 to
3.5 per cent. China has been much less significant as a source of FDI. Its share of
outward FDI between 2000 and 2003 was less than 0.5 per cent of global total
flows (UNCTAD data, cited in Jenkins and Edwards 2005: 32).
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Average price Price index
Ghana £50 100%
South Africa £60 120%
China £30 60%
There has been a rapid growth in the flow of Chinese FDI, following the govern-
ment’s ‘go global’ strategy initiated in 2001 and directed at the corporate sector.
FDI in SSA reached a total of $1bn by mid-2005, up by $125m in the first six
months of 2005 alone (World Bank 2004a for all data in this paragraph). For many
firms, SSA is an important proving ground. As a Chinese hotel manager in Sierra
Leone observed, ‘Africa is a good environment for Chinese investment, because it’s
not too competitive,’ (Hilsum 2005). However, notwithstanding this drive to out-
ward FDI, the official number of investments recorded by the Chinese Ministry of
Commerce remains small – less than 50 investments p.a. between 1998 and 2002.
By comparison with that from other Asian economies, Chinese FDI also tends to
be relatively small-scale, with an average size of less than $3m between 1998 and
2002. However, after 1998 the flow of Chinese FDI increased dramatically, exceed-
ing the value of flows from Japan. Prior to the large Chinese investments in the
energy sector in SSA in recent years, most of this FDI was directed to South Africa
(manufacturing) and Zambia (copper).
The pattern of recent Chinese involvement in production in SSA, including through
FDI, can be characterised by four major trends:
l Increasing investments in the energy and resource sectors;
l Participation in infrastructural projects;
l Participation in global production networks;
l Small scale entrepreneurial investments.
3.2.1 Investments in the energy and resource sectors
In recent years, Chinese energy companies have become increasingly prominent as
investors in Africa. The Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is heavily
involved in Sudan where it is engaged in a joint venture with the Sudan
Government, Petronas (Malaysia) and the Talisman Energy (Canada). It has a 40 per
cent share in the $1.7bn Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, an equivalent
share in a new project in Darfur and in the Melut Basin. It is a big investor in
Nigeria where it received access to exploration sites as part of a package which
included the construction of a 1,000 megawatt hydroelectric plant in Mambila. In
also has a controlling share of a refinery in Kaduna. A second Chinese energy 
company, Sinopec, is an investor in the Sudan, Gabon and Angola.
Chinese investments in the mining sector, primarily in copper in Zambia, have
exceeded $160m and Chinese firms are beginning to invest also in cobalt and cop-
per mines in the DRC.
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7 Some of this was ‘round-tripping’ FDI – Chinese firms exporting capital to Hong Kong and 
then taking advantage of government incentives for inward FDI.
3.2.2 Investment in infrastructural projects
Chinese firms have become an increasingly important participant in the construc-
tion sector (Centre for Chinese Studies 2006). Many of these firms are state-
owned, as in the case of the China Road and Bridge Corporation which was
involved in 500 construction projects by 2004. Participation in infrastructure and
construction projects range from stadiums in West Africa, to Presidential Palaces (in
Kinshasa), dams (a $650m tender for Nile River Merowe Dam project), roads, rail-
ways and government buildings. 
Chinese involvement in Mozambique is indicative both of the growing scale of
these activities and the competitiveness of Chinese firms. (This discussion on
Mozambique is drawn from Bosten 2006.) Remarkably, it also occurs in an economy
where currently China appears to see no specific strategic interest in resources to
feed the growing appetite of its manufacturing sector. It has singularly failed to
invest in any of the recent investments in the Mozal Aluminium Smelter, Sasol
Natural Gas, Kenmare Mineral Sands, Moatize Coal Mines and the Corridor Sands
Titanium Project. Chinese firms have also not tendered for some large infrastructure
projects such as the Maputo Port Development Project, the Limpopo railway line,
the Zambezi Bridge construction (2006–2009), and the rehabilitation of the Sena
railway line. 
Instead, Chinese firms began by engaging in prominent Chinese aid-related projects
such as the Mozambique Parliament buildings (1999), the building for the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (2004), the Chissano Conference Centre (2003) and the new
military quarter. Each of these projects either involves gift-aid or loans on conces-
sional terms, ranging from £5m for the Conference Centre to $12m for the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs building. In Namibia, Chinese firms have built aid-related show-
pieces such as the Supreme Court and the Police and Prison Training College in
Windhoek, a luxury hotel in Walvis Bay and a housing estate in Katimo Mulilo
(Dobler 2006).
Very recently, Chinese firms have begun to branch out into a soya processing plant
($10m), the production of prawns ($12m), a large shopping centre and industrial
warehousing in Maputo. Perhaps more significantly, Chinese firms have begun to
compete effectively in the rehabilitation of infrastructure, particularly roads, where
Chinese firms are involved in the repair of more than 600 kms of Mozambique’s
roads (two-thirds of the total being rehabilitated), and the rehabilitation of a large
bridge between Mozambique and Tanzania. Chinese firms have also recently won
tenders to repair water systems in Maputo ($30m) and Beira and Quelimane ($15m). 
This growing participation in construction and infrastructure reflects the competi-
tiveness of Chinese firms, which are reported to provide good quality projects at a
price discount of 25 to 50 per cent compared to other foreign investors. It is not
clear how this cost-advantage is derived, but preliminary enquiry suggests it arises
from a combination of factors which include:
l Lower margins;
l Chinese firms have access to much cheaper capital than local investors;8
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l The almost exclusive employment of low-paid Chinese staff, often apparently 
living at even lower standards than the Mozambique population, and living in 
secluded barracks;
l The use of Chinese materials, with very little local sourcing;
l The use of standard designs; 
l Less attention to environmental impacts;
l Access to a hard currency premium paid by the Chinese government;
l The Chinese Government provides subsidies to Chinese companies when they 
establish themselves overseas.
A study of Chinese Construction firms in four SSA economies (Angola, Sierra
Leone, Tanzania and Zambia) provides some data on the source of the competitive-
ness of Chinese construction firms (Centre for Chinese Studies 2006). This arises in
part from the intensive use of Chinese labour. For example, in Angola, Chinese con-
struction firms pay Chinese workers around $1 per day, compared to non-Chinese
companies who pay their Angolan workers $3–4 per day. But it also arises from the
use of cheap inputs sourced largely from China rather than from the local economy.
Again, in Angola, cement imported from China costs $4/50kg, compared to $10/kg
for Angolan-made cement. Chinese firms also benefited heavily from low-cost and
sometimes subsidised capital, although this was more difficult to evidence.
3.2.3 Incorporation in global production systems
Chinese manufactured exports are more effectively described as ‘East Asian 
products’, incorporating inputs from surrounding countries (Humphrey and Schmitz
2006). In fact China is in trade-deficit in its region. This reflects a process of the
growing interconnection of production in regional, coordinated value chains, and
trade in increasingly finely-differentiated intermediate products.9
With one exception, there is little evidence that Chinese and SSA firms are inter-
connected in these global value chains. The exception is the case of textiles and
garments. As saw in Section 3.1 above, exports of clothing to the US have become
very significant for six SSA economies, including for four least developed economies
– Lesotho, Madagascar, Kenya and Swaziland. The basis for their export success
under the AGOA programme is the specific derogation which gives them the
opportunity to incorporate fabric and other inputs sourced from outside the AGOA
region or the USA. This is a temporary derogation which has been extended once
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8 In the case of the clothing and textiles sectors, the cost of capital for Chinese investors (less 
than 3 per cent) is much lower than for COMESA investors (in the region of 15 per cent) 
(Manchester Trade Team 2005).
9 This is one reason why the use of aggregate trade data provides little insight into the drivers
of trade since it fails to distinguish between largely ‘arms-length’ inter-industry trade in 
complementary products and intra-industry trade in intermediates in coordinated global and
regional value chains.
(from September 2005 to 2007), and which is currently the subject of intense 
lobbying.
As Figure 3.4 shows, the result has been a very rapid rise in the proportion of non-
AGOA and non-US sourced cloth incorporated in SSA AGOA exports to the USA.
Only South Africa (and Mauritius – not included in this figure) are excluded from
this derogation, with the consequence (as we saw above in Table 3.4) of a sharp fall
in its AGOA exports following quota removal in 2005. Most of these AGOA cloth-
ing producers source their textiles from China. This is even the case for the
Taiwanese clothing exporters, many of whom came to SSA in the late 1980s 
precisely because the governments of the recipient countries had refused to 
recognise mainland China. 
What this phenomenon displays is the very industry-specific integration of produc-
tion in global value chains. But it is fragile, and most foreign investors (almost exclu-
sively Asian-owned), as well as domestically-owned clothing firms report that if the
derogation is not renewed after September 2007, they will close their SSA plants
(Kaplinsky and Morris 2006a).
Figure 3.4 Share of non-AGOA and non-US cloth in AGOA exports
to US, 2004–2005
Source: Calculated from US Department of Commerce, Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA).
3.2.4 Small scale entrepreneurial investments
In some SSA economies, there appears to be the growth of small-scale entrepre-
neurial investment from China, often presaged by the construction of specialised
shopping malls retailing Chinese goods. One country for which there is fragmentary
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evidence is Sierra Leone. Here, Chinese FDI has become very prominent, particular-
ly in a context where more traditional European and US investors have been wary
of political risks and are subject to pressures to support good governance. Chinese
investors appear to be less concerned with these risks and very flexible and rapid in
their responses. The Sierra Leone ambassador to Beijing observed that 
The Chinese are doing more than the G8 to make poverty history … If a G8
country had wanted to rebuild the stadium, we’d still be holding meetings! The
Chinese just come and do it. They don’t hold meetings about environmental
impact assessment, human rights, bad governance and good governance. I’m
not saying it’s right, just that Chinese investment is succeeding because they
don’t set high benchmarks.
(Hilsum 2005) 
Investments in Sierra Leone include a joint venture with the government in an
industrial estate making mattresses, tiles, hair lotions and other light industrial prod-
ucts. Unlike other Chinese FDI in SSA’s resource and energy sectors, most of these
investments in Sierra Leone are undertaken by small-scale private investors, in this
case mostly from Hunan Province (Financial Times, 16 March 2005).
An important, and almost certainly significant (albeit poorly evidenced) channel of
Chinese presence in SSA is the growing number of Chinese traders to be found in
many SSA economies. A good example of this is the expanding community of
wholesalers in Oshikango, Namibia, a small trading town on the broader with
Southern Angola (Dobler 2006). By 2005 there were between 70 and 120 Chinese
working in 22 shops in this trading complex. They originate from all over China, and
have little in common, even speaking different Chinese dialects. The pioneer in this
region came to Namibia in 1993, and moved to Oshikango in 1999. Perhaps
because of his relative longevity, he is the only trader who has diversified into other
regions in Namibia. Oshikango’s Chinese traders mostly import and then re-export
basic consumer goods such as clothing, textiles, footwear, simple electronic
consumer goods and mattresses. These are sold at a very cheap price – a carton of
300 shoes, for example, for $100.10 This phenomenon of small-scale trading is not
limited to Namibia, and similar rapidly-growing trade-linked communities are found
all over SSA. The number of Chinese living in Lusaka is estimated to have increased
from 3,000 to 30,000 over the past decade, with an estimated 160,000 Chinese
living in South Africa, many of whom are clustered in a suburb of Johannesburg.
3.2.5 SSA FDI in China
The flow of FDI between SSA and China is not one-way, although most of SSA
investment in China comes from South Africa. Here a number of large South
African firms have a growing presence. This includes SABMiller (now the world’s
second largest brewing company), which has invested more than $400m in China
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10 The invoiced import price for these same products is an astonishingly-low $5, suggesting 
the possibility of under-invoicing from China, perhaps to fund round-tripping FDI back into 
China.
since 1994, and has equity in 30 local breweries (Goldstein 2004). Other large
investors are SASOL, which is about to join local Chinese investors in two very
large coal-to-petroleum plants (each at more than $3bn) in the North West
Province of China, Kumba Resources (part of Anglo American) in the production of
Zinc, SAPPI (also owned by Anglo American, in paper), Polifin in chemicals and
ABSA and NEDCOR in the financial sector.
Aside from these South African investments, there are a few isolated cases of firms
whose origins lay in SSA investing in China. Chandaria Holdings, with its roots in
Tanzania and subsequently in Kenya, has for example a number of manufacturing
plants in China which it sees as the focal point for its new investments in develop-
ing countries (Interview with Dr Manu Chandaria, June 2004).
3.3 The aid channel
As in the linked case of FDI, Chinese aid to SSA, of which little is known, appears
to be very closely linked to strategic and political objectives, perhaps even more so
than the aid offered by some European countries and the US. The formal links
between China and SSA go back to the Bandung Conference in 1955. Until the
mid-1990s, much of this aid was directed to Liberation Movements and to further
the desire to politically isolate Taiwan. But since the mid 1990s, aid appears to be
increasingly directed towards broader strategic objectives, and in particular to the
development of links with resource-rich SSA economies. In general, Chinese aid is
closely bundled with infrastructural projects, often linked to the extraction and
export of minerals and oil to China.
Chinese aid to SSA can be grouped into six categories. The first is financial 
assistance for key investments. As of mid-2005, the Chinese government had 
provided aid to approximately 800 individual projects, including flagship projects
such as the 1,860 km TAZARA railway linking Zambia and Tanzania in the early
1970s (Box 3.1). Linked to this, in recent years, has been a programme of limited
debt-relief, totalling RMB10.5bn owed by 31 SSA countries. The third form of aid
provided has been a growing training programme (http://english.sina.com/
china/1/2006/0107/60908.html, accessed 3 March 2006). China’s African Human
Resources Development Fund had provided training in China to 9,400 Africans by
the end of 2004, and a further 3,800 places were planned for each of 2005 and
2006. 15,600 scholarships were offered to 52 SSA countries in 2005. Fourth, China
has provided technical assistance to SSA – more than 600 teachers and more than
15,000 Chinese doctors have worked in 52 SSA countries (including 1,100 at the
end of 2004). 
Fifth, in an initiative announced at the second ministerial meeting of the Sino-
African Cooperation Forum held at the end of 2003, China has instituted a 
programme of tariff exemption for 25 SSA economies, covering 190 products,
including food, textiles, minerals and machinery. The policy took effect at the
beginning of 2005 (People’s Daily, 20 October 2005, www.chinadaily.com.cn,
accessed 3 March 2006). These trade references are called for since Chinese tariffs
on imports from SSA, although generally lower than Indian tariffs, were significant-
ly higher than those in other Asian economies. We do not have data on the 
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differential tariffs levied by China on imports from SSA compared to tariffs levied by 
individual SSA countries on imports from China. Finally, China has in very recent
years begun to provide peacekeeping forces to SSA, with 1,500 troops being
deployed by mid-2006.
Box 3.1 China’s rehabilitation of railway infrastructure in oil-
supplying SSA economies
In 2006 China provided soft-loans to finance the reconstruction of creaking
transport infrastructure in a number of SSA oil-supplying economies. These
loans included:
l $1bn to Nigeria to repair old lines and supply new rolling stock and 
equipment;
l rebuild almost half of Angola’s 754 road highways;
l $500m to overhaul Angola’s rail network;
l offer of a further $1.5bn to upgrade other parts of Angola’s transport 
network.
Source: Guardian, 23 May 2006.
3.4 The vectors in aggregate
In assessing the overall impact of these links between China and SSA, we return to
the architectural classifications laid out in Section 2. We began by observing that
China’s impact on SSA can be gauged in relation to three primary vectors – trade,
production and FDI, and aid. Each of these vectors, as we have seen in Section 3, is
inter-related. China’s trade impact (direct and indirect) in clothing and textiles, for
example, is closely linked to the integration of SSA and Chinese firms in coordinat-
ed global value chains, and China’s growing aid programme appears to be closely
related to its need for traded commodities. We saw in Section 2 that these links
may be both complementary and competitive, and direct and indirect. 
We also noted at the outset of this Agenda-Paper in Section 1 that there is a great
danger of focusing on the present, the known and the measurable impacts.
Moreover, partly because there is a great need to search for a solution to SSA’s
problems, and partly because the direct bilateral links are easier to see than the
direct (and perhaps more negative indirect impacts), there is a danger of focusing
unduly on the positive opportunities and neglecting the potentially negative 
disruptive impacts of China’s growing impact on SSA.
With these caveats in mind, what can be said in aggregate about China’s impact on
SSA? Figure 3.6 is an elaboration of the synthetic framework which we set out in
Figure 3.1 above. It presents some of the major conclusions which emerged from
our review of what is known about the three key vectors (and discussed in Sections
3.1–3.3). A number of tentative conclusions can be drawn, although the major point
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of Table 3.10 is not so much to provide a comprehensive overview (since so little is
known about the detail of these impacts, and so many are only of emerging
importance), but rather a framework for thinking through the issues and the range
and extent of potential impacts. 
The conclusions which we draw are as follows:
l We are not able to fill all the ‘cells’ in this framework. For example, it is 
possible that there will be indirect complementary effects in the FDI/
production channel, and it is conceivable that Chinese-coordinated global value 
chains producing in the Middle East may source inputs from plants located in 
SSA. But we can find no evidence for this type of linkage. Does this inability to 
fill cells reflect the absence of impacts, unmeasured impacts or poorly-
manifested impacts?
l Direct impacts are easily evidenced, both with regard to complementary and 
competitive impacts. By contrast, indirect inputs are more difficult to evidence 
and much more difficult to measure.
l Data on the trade channel (Section 3.1 above) is much better than that on the 
production/FDI and aid vectors. Is this a function of our lack of knowledge on 
production and aid and/or the availability of global trade data, or does the trade
impact assert itself first and most significantly?
l With the exception of indirect competitive effects in manufacturing through 
the trade channel, in general the balance of existing evidence would tend to 
support the view that the positive impacts (‘opportunities’) are probably more 
important than the negative impacts (‘threats’). But it is unclear whether this is
a function of the evidence which is available, or the reality of the real world. 
l It is difficult to generalise across countries and sectors. They might experience 
the impacts in each of these three vectors in very different ways. For example, 
commodity exporters in SSA may gain from rising commodity prices (comple
mentary indirect effects), whilst SSA commodity importers may suffer from the
very same price rise (competitive indirect effects).
l We have no available methodology for providing a ‘net outcome’, even for
individual countries and regions. This is partly because some impacts are not-
measurable, and partly because they involve trade-offs between winners 
(consumers buying cheap clothing imports) and losers (displaced domestic
producers of clothing).
Table 3.8 provides a largely static picture. For example, it suggests that the trade
impacts have been most important so far. How will this change over time?
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Table 3.8 China and SSA: the three primary vectors, and 
complementary-competitive and direct-indirect impacts
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Direct Indirect
Trade
Comple-
mentary
l Inputs for industries
l Cheap consumption goods
l Higher global prices for
SSA exports
Competitive
l Displacement of existing 
and potential local prod-
ucers by cheap Chinese 
products
l Competition in external 
markets – falling prices and 
falling market shares
Production
and FDI 
Direct Indirect
Comple-
mentary
l Chinese FDI in SSA, 
particularly in fragile states
l Cheap and appropriate 
capital goods
l Technology transfer
l Integration in global value 
chains, particularly in 
clothing
l Low-cost infrastructure
Competitive
l Displacement of existing 
and potential local 
producers
l Less spin-off to local econ
omy than other foreign 
contractors 
l Use of scarce resources
l Competition for global FDI 
and production platforms
l Disinvestment and reloca
tion by other foreign 
investors (for example, 
clothing and furniture)
Aid
Direct Indirect
Comple-
mentary
l Grants and concessional 
finance
l Technical assistance
l Training
Competitive
l Chinese aid to Latin 
America creates productive
capacity which competes 
with SSA producers and 
lowers export prices
4 Key issues
What follows from this analysis of the impact of China on SSA, and how does this
inform major policy choices?
In the discussion which follows in this section, we address the implications for
policy in six key areas. We do not offer detailed prescriptions for change but,
instead, as in the case of the synthetic framework used to assess the impact of
China on SSA, to see these as promoting the basis for discussions with key stake-
holders, within SSA and China, in DFID and with and in other bi- and multi-lateral
agencies. The key issues are:
1 The challenges posed to industrial policy and sectoral choice;
2 The problems posed for commodity producers;
3 Reacting to changing patterns of poverty and income distribution;
4 The implications for the promotion of good governance, particularly in 
regard to fragile states;
5 Global and regional links;
6 Thinking about the future;
7 Filling the knowledge gaps.
4.1 The challenges posed to industrial policy and sectoral choice
It is in the industrial sector that SSA is most clearly challenged by the growth of
the Chinese economy. In the absence of Chinese demand for SSA manufactured
exports (with the marginal exception of South Africa) China’s impact on SSA indus-
trialisation arises from its growing exports. This affects SSA on two related and
threatening fronts – competition in internal markets for domestically-oriented
manufacturers, and competition in external markets from export-oriented industry.
It is in the clothing, textiles, furniture and footwear sectors that most is known
about these issues. With regard to domestic markets, imports from Asia generally,
and China in particular, are making life very hard for domestic manufacturers.
Ghanaian furniture and clothing exporters find it increasingly difficult to compete
with Chinese imports, as do South African manufacturers (Kaplinsky and Morris
2006b). A similar pattern can be found in the Ethiopian footwear sector (Egziabher
2006). Although data is scarce, discussions with manufacturers and retailers in a
number of SSA economies with domestic manufacturing sectors suggest that
import penetration is increasing in all markets, and in most of the traded-goods
manufactured sectors.
However, the challenge to SSA industry is much more substantial than these 
current impacts might suggest. This is because for much of SSA, industry is 
currently poorly developed, and is often largely confined to the food-processing
industry (where products degrade over time and have a high transport-to-value
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ratio), building materials (a high transport-to-value ratio and producing customised
products) and the informal manufacturing sector (producing to low levels of quality
and largely using waste materials. The real policy challenge is not to existing 
industry, but to potential industry. That is, what space is there for SSA manufactur-
ing to expand in the future? And, what implications does this have for the growth
of dynamic capabilities, learning externalities and structural transformation?
What can be done about this bleak picture? First, there is scope for improving the
productivity of existing industries, often by working with value chains (for example,
forestry, timber and furniture) rather than individual firms or subsectors. Detailed
firm-level analysis of productivity in the clothing sector in South Africa (Barnes,
Morris and Gastrow 2006) and in COMESA (Manchester Trade Team 2005) detail
the nature of these productivity gaps. Kaplinsky and Morris (2006a) also report 
evidence of significant productivity improvements following the introduction of
training schemes in Lesotho. Competitiveness in all sectors is a moving target, and
for various reasons, few SSA industries have hitherto been able to address this 
challenge of building dynamic capabilities. There is, however, no intrinsic reason why
this should be the case, and there is thus considerable scope for effective industrial
policies.
A second area of policy intervention arises with respect to trade policy. Here there
may be a need for selective protection on the import side. But, as we saw in the
earlier discussion of AGOA exports, SSA requires continued preferential treatment
against China (and other Asian economies) in external markets. With regard to the
US, the derogation on rules of entry in the clothing sector must be sustained
beyond September 2007, even if it provides incentives which act contrary to deep-
ening value added in the textiles sector. To avoid this stifling innovation, there is
therefore the need to link AGOA rules of origin derogation to active industrial
policies to promote the textiles sector in the SSA region. EU roles of origin are so
tightly specified and restrictive that they provide little scope for least developed
country exports of manufactures from SSA, particularly in the clothing and textiles
sector.
A further important lesson which emerges from China’s growing trade presence is
for SSA producers to be less concerned about the sector of production (for exam-
ple, manufacturing versus services versus agriculture) and more focused on identify-
ing niches where they can build barriers to entry to Chinese producers through the
development of innovative capabilities. In manufacturing this may be increasingly
difficult as Chinese competences grow, whereas in horticulture and services, includ-
ing knowledge-intensive services, relative capabilities may be high, as in the case of
Kenya’s horticulture sector, South Africa’s medical sector and East Africa’s wildlife
tourist sector.
4.2 The problems posed for commodity producers
Probably the most significant opportunity opened-up to SSA by China’s rapid
growth is the enhanced incentives which rising demand and prices provide to 
commodity producing countries. Many SSA economies have rich primary product
resources, including some of the poorest economies such as Nigeria, the DRC and
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Angola, many of whom are characterised by fragile states. Rapid growth in South
Africa (and in other middle-income commodity exporters in Latin America) is an
indication of the benefits which this might provide.
Yet, one of the sharpest lessons we can draw from comparative international 
experience is that there is no clear correlation between development and com-
modity resources. Some commodity producers have fared well – Australia and
Canada are cases in point. By contrast other commodity producers have fared badly,
reflecting what some have termed the ‘resource curse’. In yet other cases such as
Korea and Japan, rapid economic growth has occurred without significant
resources – indeed, it is often argued that that they grew because of the absence
of resources.
Nevertheless, China’s growing demand for resources does offer significant 
opportunities to many SSA economies. But the lesson which can be drawn from
international experience is that the benefits of this resource boom will not follow
automatically – they need effective management. In addition to the link between
patterns of governance and resource-exploitation (which we will consider below in
Section 4.4), this poses four major challenges to economic and social policy. 
First and foremost, those economies with suitable natural resources need to 
develop the supply elasticities required to take advantage of raised global demand
and prices. This may require a combination of inputs, including enhanced infrastruc-
ture, targeted wooing of selected global resource-producing firms and the develop-
ment of training and research and technology organisations (RTOs) in the respective
National Systems of Innovation.
Second, resources are often finite (at least in high-grade deposits) and prices are
often cyclical. There is thus a clear need to husband resource to ensure that the
fruits can be drawn down over time, rather than at a single point in time. This
poses important challenges for the economic management of resource rents (as
Gottschalk and Prates 2005 stress in their analysis of China’s growing trade with
Latin America). Clearly SSA policymakers can gain from comparative experience in
this regard. Third, and related, one of the major problems posed by a growth in
commodity prices is the impact on exchange rates – the ‘Dutch Disease’. Higher
exports and raised prices often lead to currency appreciation. This creates problems
for other exporting sectors, and promotes forms of structural change which lead to
a reallocation of resources from the traded- to the non-traded goods sectors. Many
non-commodity exporters in SSA are beginning to suffer from these Dutch Disease
effects, particularly those linked to the appreciating Rand. Here there are perverse
and adverse impacts on Lesotho and Swaziland – they face the downside of a cur-
rency appreciating due to commodity exports, without benefiting on the upside
from raised commodity revenues. Again, SSA governments can learn from interna-
tional experience in this regard, including from relatively successful SSA economies
such as Botswana.
A fourth policy challenge arises in regard to the management of the environmental
consequences of resource exploitation. This is most topical in relation to the 
depletion of forests (www.globaltimber.org.uk), which affects not only large global
issues such as climate change, but also the location-specific degradation of specific
environments (such as the recent mudslide in the Philippines which destroyed a
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whole town and arose as a consequence of illegal timber logging). These environ-
mental spillovers are often substantial, and are not confined to the logging sector.
The negative externalities may also be widespread, arising in part also as a conse-
quence of transporting commodities to the coast.
4.3 Reacting to changing patterns of poverty and income 
distribution
Trade-related income poverty and distribution impacts can be very substantial
(McCulloch, Winters and Cirera 2002). Although little is known about the detailed
impact on China’s trade on SSA patterns of income distribution, there are reasons
to believe that it will be very substantial.
On the positive side, one of the major implications of growing imports of manu-
factures from China is the benefits which this provides to consumers, particularly to
low-income consumers. This is not just a phenomenon affecting SSA, since the
decline in prices of basic manufactures is a primary factor holding inflation at bay in
many OECD economies (including the UK). As we have seen, many SSA manufac-
turers complain that Chinese products are displacing locally-produced commodities,
but as Jenkins and Edwards point out, the primary displacement effect is on
imports of manufactures from other, non-SSA economies.11 Wholesalers and 
retailers are switching their sourcing to cheap Chinese suppliers, and this almost
certainly has major positive impacts on consumer welfare. It is however an 
unmeasured impact, and we have little idea of its overall significance in consumer
welfare, nor in which sectors the primary benefits are being felt. This is because
most household consumption studies do not collect data at a sufficiently 
disaggregated basis, failing even to distinguish between food- and non-food 
purchases, let alone different types or sources of manufactures.
There are also rapidly-emerging negative consequences of Chinese trade on income
distribution. On the one hand, employment in many labour-intensive manufacturing
sectors is being lost, most visibly in export-oriented clothing enterprises (see Table
3.6 above). On the other hand, the rise in commodity production is associated both
with capital-intensive technologies (biasing returns to holders of capital, rather than
to labour), and because of the large-scale of commodity production, to highly-
concentrated forms of ownership. This is not an intrinsic problem of all primary
production, since many soft-commodities (such as tea, coffee, cotton and 
horticulture) are labour-intensive and locally-owned, But, hitherto, most commodity
exports to China have been oil and hard commodities, particularly basic metals.
There is an additional global dimension to these emerging patterns of income 
distribution, since manufacturing incomes are either largely local within SSA (labour)
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11 Jenkins and Edwards conclude, ‘In the absence of data on the expenditure patterns of poor
households and the extent to which they consume imported goods it is only possible to
make a crude estimate of the likely impact of imports’ (Jenkins and Edwards 2005: 29). 
‘Only in Uganda of the eight countries, do basic consumer goods account for more than 
20 per cent of total imports from China, although both Ghana and Tanzania are slightly 
below this level’ (ibid.: 29).
or flow to firms based in low- and middle-income Asian economies (including in
India and Sri Lanka). By contrast, with the exception of South Africa, commodity
production almost exclusively occurs through the operations of foreign transnational
firms. A mitigating factor with regard to the distributional consequences of
commodity production is that it is relatively easy to tax, providing revenues to 
governments. But as we shall see in Section 4.4 below, the use of these state 
revenues does not necessarily suggest that their poverty and distributional impacts
are positive.
4.4 The implications for the promotion of good governance, 
particularly in regard to fragile states
Recent years have seen concerted and multifaceted attempts by Western aid
donors, consumers and NGOs to promote various initiatives aimed at promoting
good governance in SSA. Some of these address the issue of transparency, some
are targeted at preventing abuses of human rights and some are aimed at the 
corporate sector with respect to labour rights and environmental impacts.
Much of Chinese FDI and investment in SSA has run against attempts by the global
aid-community to promote better governance in SSA. For example, in the Sudan,
the major Canadian investor withdrew because of concerns about Darfur and
Sudan’s poor record on human rights. Its 40 per cent shareholding was replaced by
CNPC, a China-state-owned oil company. This has led to Sudan’s emergence as a
net oil-exporter. It has also led to China becoming a major exporter of manu-
factures to Sudan. China supplies weaponry to Sudan and has helped construct
plants in Sudan to manufacture small arms and ammunition. More visibly, China has
vetoed attempts in the Security Council to actively censure Sudan for the civil war
in Darfur. 
In Angola, after Western donors postponed a donors-conference meeting due to
concerns with non-transparency in mid-2005, China offered Angola a soft-loan of
$2bn. This soft loan, for 17 years at 1.5 per cent per annum with a five year grace
period (but tied to China-sourced inputs) also enabled Chinese firms to win-out
over Indian competitors in accessing Angolan oil reserves. In Zimbabwe, although
offering much less involvement and aid than Mugabe requested, Chinese firms have
invested in the minerals and farming sectors, and have helped rehabilitate roads. In
June 2006, China agreed to build three power stations and provide other infra-
structural assistance worth in excess of $1bn in exchange for commodities such as
chrome. Whilst Western countries have embargoed arms-sales to Zimbabwe, China
has continued supplying military equipment, including K8 fighter planes. 
In the private sector, whilst Western firms have demanded fair labour practices in
production in products sourced directly from SSA countries, some of the produc-
tion routed through Chinese firms has not complied with labour standards in the
same way (Kaplinsky and Morris 2006a). There are also accusations that Chinese
firms have imported illegally-logged timber from SSA (www.globaltimber.org.uk),
and as we saw earlier, the Sierra Leone ambassador to Beijing remarked that the
Chinese ‘Don’t hold meetings about environmental impact assessment, human
rights, bad governance and good governance. I’m not saying it’s right, just that
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Chinese investment is succeeding because they don’t set high benchmarks’ 
(Hilsum 2005).
The ability of Chinese firms to invest in fragile states – such as Angola, the DRC,
Sudan and Sierra Leone – is almost certainly linked to the political economy of the
Chinese corporate sector. Many Chinese firms investing on SSA are partly or wholly
state-owned, and reflect the desire of the Chinese government to build a long-
term presence in a resource-rich continent. But, perhaps even more so than in the
case of other forms of Chinese participation in SSA, this is an area of great 
sensitivity which is characterised by assertion and rumour as much as by detailed
evidence.
There is a further indirect impact of China’s demand for commodities on the nature
of governance in SSA. In the 1960s in particular, the very large surpluses that some
African economies could earn from exporting agricultural commodities stimulated
kleptocratic governance and undermined the legitimacy of newly-independent
regimes. Since the 1970s, world market prices for most agricultural exports have
declined substantially, and this form of kleptocracy has declined considerably.
However, recent research shows that rents derived from the extraction of ‘point
resources’ (oil, gas, diamonds and minerals) have, since the 1970s, clearly encouraged
authoritarian rule, high military expenditure, corruption and violence (Rosser 2006).
There are wide variations within Africa. Whilst Botswana is often cited as the
exception to the general pattern, in other African countries, the discovery of large
mineral resources has led to the deterioration in the standard of living of most 
people. This is the recent experience of the African country where Chinese 
companies are most deeply involved in resource extraction – the Sudan. Thus, to
the extent that there is a generic trend towards commodity production and mineral
rents as a consequence of China’s growing need for material inputs, it is likely that
this will exacerbate some forms of poor governance in SSA.
4.5 Global and regional integration
Historically, most of SSA’s trade links have been with the former metropolitan
powers, either directly with the UK (in the case of Anglophone countries) and
France (for Francophone countries), or more generally with Europe and North
America. These links have been strengthened through the development of various
forms of preferential trade arrangements (Lome-Cotonou, AGOA, EPAs and FTAs).
It is not surprising therefore, as we saw in Figure 1.1, that currently most of SSA’s
trade is with the historically industrialised countries.
Two major developments are disturbing these historical patterns. First, and this 
conclusion emerges from the data on trade patterns, there appears to be a 
naturally growing regional market in southern Africa, as is occurring in the case of
Merciful in Latin America, reflecting regional externalities in production (Evans,
Kaplinsky and Robinson 2006). But, secondly, the rapid growth in trade between
SSA and China (and to some extent India) evidenced in Table 1.1 suggests a growing
‘magnetic pull’ from the East. This poses a major policy challenge to individual and
groups of SSA economies, particularly relevant in the context of stretched policy
and administrative systems – given the growing importance of regional ties in the
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global economy, who should they link with, and what forms of linkage might this
involve? Should they aim to go North, go East or stay local?
Here it is possible to distinguish between what might be termed ‘Negative
Integration’ and ‘Positive Integration’ (Evans et al. 2006). The former refers to the
removal of barriers to trade, as in the case of FTAs and WTO-orchestrated multi-
lateral trade liberalisation. In contrast, positive integration involves targeted policies
focusing on particular forms of market imperfections (for example, promoting
learning about China and its language), strengthening poor infrastructure constrain-
ing particular geographical links, and actively seeking to develop various forms of
‘deep integration’ in China-SSA global value chains. It may also involve the develop-
ment of particular patterns of trade preference, as in the recent Chinese initiative
to lower tariffs on imports of manufactures from 25 least developed SSA
economies.
Increasingly, SSA economies are going to need to develop explicit policies in these
areas. It will necessarily involve a ‘joined-up’ mix of economic and political initiatives.
As SSA loosens its links with Europe and North America, it will also be necessary
for countries, particularly those in southern Africa, to determine how much weight
they wish to place on intra-continental regional links, and how much on forging
new regional links with China and other Asian Driver economies.
4.6 Thinking about the future – the development of ‘dynamic
capabilities’
As we have seen, economic and political links between China and SSA are changing
very rapidly. From the perspective of SSA economies, therefore, it is the capacity to
change, to grasp opportunities and to minimise threats that is key. In the business
literature, this is referred to as the development of ‘dynamic capabilities’. This
involves a combination of search-capabilities, strategic-formulation-capabilities and
implementation-capabilities, as well as the capacity to continually change these as
new threats and opportunities arise.
Many of the dynamic capabilities which are required to meet these challenges are
prefigured in the policy-related issues discussed in Sections 4.1–4.6 above. There is
however at last one additional capability which is required, and that is the ability of
SSA producers to anticipate future opportunities and threats opened-up by 
sustained Chinese expansion. For example, one emerging opportunity is the promo-
tion of Chinese tourism. China has recently ‘certified’ seven SSA countries as tourist
destinations, with more than 70,000 tourists visiting Africa in the 20 months to
end-2005. With the growth in Chinese per capita incomes, there is likely to be a
considerable growth in tourism in the future.
Another possibility is in regard to China’s food needs. At 3,040, China’s per capita
calorie consumption is on average 90 per cent of that in the high income
economies (Chen et al. 2006), so future import needs are likely to reflect a change
in the composition of food consumption rather than a significant increase in its 
volume (FAO 2002). So far, China has sourced very little food from SSA (or, indeed,
from elsewhere), partly because it has imported intermediates such as animal feed
to support its own meat-producing sector. Most of the feed imported so far has
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been soya, and the primary origin of these imports has been from Latin America
(Jenkins, Dussel Peters and Moreira 2006). Although this has had knock-on effects
of Ethiopia’s exports of sesame (a substitute in some markets for soya), SSA has
gained little from this trade in animal-feeds. 
This raises a series of strategic issues for SSA food producers, which require careful
consideration, informed by data rather than wild speculation. Will China continue to
produce its own meat? Will its growing per capita income lead it to import horti-
cultural products, fish and chicken? If they do, will these imports come directly
from eastern and southern African economies which have a demonstrated compar-
ative advantage in some of these sectors, or will SSA gain indirectly from China’s
growing imports from a supply-constrained global economy? As we saw above,
Chinese investors are beginning to pioneer soya production in Mozambique and this
may be a sign of future prospects.
These examples of tourism and soya are just that – examples. They represent future
possibilities. At the same time, it is also necessary to anticipate future threats. A
major potential problem for many SSA economies is the possibility that energy
prices will rise significantly as a consequence of constrained global supplies and 
rapidly growing demand from China and India. So, too, might the price for other
SSA imports, including food. What pressures will a rapidly diversifying Chinese
economy place on economies such as South Africa who have become successful
exporters of automobiles and auto components?
4.7 Filling the knowledge gaps
It is abundantly clear from the discussion above that we know more about the
questions which have to be addressed on China’s impact on SA than on the nature
of these impacts. There are significant knowledge-gaps, and unless these are filled,
policy- and capability-development will be undermined and may be misdirected. 
We can conclude with some confidence that the three primary vectors of trans-
mission are indeed trade, FDI/production and aid, and that we know more about
the direct impacts than the indirect impacts. We can also conclude that in order to
understand China’s growing involvement in SSA, it is as important to focus on the
geostrategic and political imperatives, as on the narrow pursuit of financial gain.
But, other than this, we cannot at present draw any conclusions with confidence.
We cannot assess whether on balance China’s impact is likely to be positive or
negative, and for which countries and regions, and for which particular stakeholders
in particular countries and regions. 
In order to widen and deepen the policy perspectives listed in Section 4.6 above,
key knowledge gaps need to be addressed, amongst which the following are most
important:
l The need for baseline studies to assess the changing future impact of China on 
SSA;
l Analyses of the determinants of SSA competitiveness and the steps required to
enhance productivity (for example, in clothing, textiles, footwear and furniture, 
as well as in export-oriented food crops);
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l A more thorough assessment of indirect impacts of China’s trade on SSA, 
facilitating the development of appropriate policies for providing special and 
differential treatment to low income SSA economies in global markets;
l Determining the impact of China on consumer welfare, income distribution 
and absolute poverty levels in SSA, through an analysis of the consumer bene
fits derived from cheaper imports and the distributional implications of a 
switch in specialisation away from labour-intensive manufactures to capital 
intensive commodities;
l Distinguishing generic from sub-regional and country-specific impacts, aiding 
the classification of different types of SSA economies;
l Identifying likely future areas of threat and opportunity;
l Determining the drivers of China’s strategic engagement with SSA and their
impact on transparent and better governance on the continent;
l Diffusing lessons from the successful experience in coping with the challenges 
posed by China, drawn both from within SSA and from other regions.
5 An agenda for whom?
Meeting this policy agenda and knowledge-gaps is a multifaceted task. It clearly is a
challenge which confronts all the major stakeholders in SSA. Governments are
clearly key stakeholders. But so are many SSA producers – firms and farms – who
are affected, directly and/or indirectly by existing and potential Chinese expansion.
How aware are they of these opportunities and threats, and what capabilities do
they require to develop these strategic capabilities and to respond appropriately?
Similar questions can of course be asked with respect to a range of civil society
actors such as trades unions and NGOs.
The Chinese government and key stakeholders in China face analogous challenges.
Are they adequately aware not just of the opportunities which are being opened-
up in SSA, but also of the threats which they pose to different stakeholders in
SSA? An example is the case of SSA’s AGOA clothing exports which experienced
an almost 20 per cent fall in the first year after quota removal with devastating
impacts on employment in Lesotho and Swaziland. Are Chinese stakeholders aware
of the problems which previous generations of resource-hungry foreign investors
confronted in SSA, including growing resentment from the local population due to
limited spillovers into the local economy? May they begin to suffer the same 
disruption in their resource activities as are currently being experienced by Shell in
Nigeria, or in previous decades when African countries nationalised resource-firms
in part because of their low linkages with the local economy? Does China need to
think about engaging with western aid donors in the promotion of good gover-
nance in SSA, not just as issues in human rights, but in order to maintain the rule
of law which Chinese investors require if they wish to obtain long-term and 
profitable access to SSA resources and markets? What responsibilities, if any, does
the Chinese government have to uphold the interests of SSA in institutions of
global governance?
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What implications are there for DFID and other bi- and multi-lateral agencies? What
roles might they play in building appropriate dynamic capabilities in SSA, in making
the Chinese more aware not just of their positive impact, but also the negative
direct and indirect impacts of their growth on SSA? How might China be 
persuaded to participate more actively in the promotion of more transparent and
better governance in SSA, particularly in countries with fragile states? What role
might they play in intermediating discussions Chinese and SSA stakeholders?
This agenda-setting paper makes no pretence to answer these, and other
important questions. Instead it has attempted to provide a framework for assessing
the state of our knowledge, and for structuring a systematic response on behalf of
key stakeholders in SSA and China.
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